Introduction
This paper presents an empirical examination of the effects of different monetary policy regimes on the measurement of core inflation. Theoretically the idea that the Phillips curve and other empirical specifications differ depending on the monetary policy regime is well known (Lucas, 1976) ; however, there is little empirical work on the issue of how to best measure core inflation in different monetary policy regimes.
Core inflation is a term that is often used but rarely defined. Popularly core inflation is the measure of inflation excluding food and energy prices. Economists refer to core inflation using several different definitions. Often it is the inflation rate that has no long run effect on the level of real output in the economy or it is the inflation rate given by the changes in input prices (Quah and Vahey, 1995 and Eckstein, 1981) . Additionally, empirical work by Byran and Ceccehetti suggest either the trimmed mean or the weighted median of the distribution of price changes might be a good proxy for core inflation. They define core inflation as both the measure with the greatest contemporaneous correlation with a centered-moving average inflation rate and the measure that is highly correlated with measures of money growth Wiggins, 1997 and Cecchetti, 1994) . Overall, there is no consensus about the definition of core inflation.
In Smith (2003) core inflation is defined as the best forecaster of future inflation. This definition appeals to the intuitive idea that is often mentioned in discussions about core inflation. Blinder (1982 and suggests this definition in several papers on inflation by emphasizing the forecasting ability that core inflation should have. Intuitively, core inflation is thought of as a useful measure in tracking future inflation.
Smith tests whether the weighted median or trimmed mean can forecast the 12-month ahead inflation rate better than the inflation rate excluding food and energy and lagged inflation for the United States since 1982. Analyzing several models that use different weightings of past inflation rates and different inflation measures (CPI and PCE) this paper finds that the weighted median is a good proxy for demand-driven inflation. These results are robust to both in-sample and out-of-sample forecasting.
Smith's paper has the limitation that it examines only the current historical period or monetary regime of the United States. The behavior of the economy does change across different monetary policy regimes and as Lucas notes, "any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of the econometric models" (pg. 41). Additionally, Stock and Watson (1999) and Sommer (2001) find that the monetary policy regime affects the forecasting ability of different variables. Additionally, Smith is limited since it provides no theoretical framework to justify the definition of core inflation as the best forecaster of future inflation. Section 3 tests the theoretical model using data from ten Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. I examine the historical record for these countries in groups. I consider several different time periods that have different levels of accommodativeness such as before and after the disinflations of the early 1980s, and pre-and post-inflation targeting.
I conclude that the measure that helps forecast does depend directly on the monetary policy regime. Core inflation is empirically estimated as a weighted average of lagged inflation and a trimmed mean. During the 1970s lagged inflation is core inflation, therefore confirming the accommodativeness of that regime. In inflation targeting regimes core inflation is represented solely by the trimmed mean. This result shows the non-accommodative nature of inflation targeting. These results are broadly similar in the conditional forecasts and demonstrate that inflation expectations are generally consistent with the regime. Finally, section 4 concludes.
Theoretical Framework
The framework has two equations. The first equation states that demand-driven inflation is related to inflation expectations and the output gap in a modified expectations-augmented Phillips curve. 
where D π is demand-driven inflation, e π is the expectation of inflation and y is the deviation of output from potential output. The second equation describes the relationship between inflation and demand-driven inflation and a supply shock.
where π is the inflation rate and ε is a supply shock. These two equations can be combined to obtain the standard expectations-augmented Phillips curve with supply shocks. Ball and Mankiw (1995) provide both theoretical and empirical evidence as to why aggregate inflation can be decomposed into demand-driven inflation and supply shocks. They examine how the distribution of price changes affects the aggregate inflation rate and propose a new measure of supply shocks based on the asymmetry of the distribution of price changes.
Their model makes a clear distinction between demand-driven inflation and supply shocks and provides a starting point for this theoretical framework. 1 Sommer specifically tests if the difference between the aggregate inflation rate and the trimmed mean is a good measure of supply shocks. He finds that it performs better than some measures proposed by Ball and Mankiw. accommodative regime the "temporary" increase in inflation from a supply shock becomes permanent because the central bank pushes demand-driven inflation up in order to take advantage of the increased output that can be produced. In the non-accommodative regime the supply shock is truly temporary since demand-driven inflation is held constant. There can also be a partial accommodation of a supply shock. In this case demand-driven inflation is a weighted average of past inflation and past demand-driven inflation.
In the conditional case demand-driven inflation is determined by agents' inflation 
where X is the year-over-year change and x is the quarterly change. For Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States the trimmed mean is the month-over-month change. I convert that to the year-over-year change by transforming the month-over-month changes in the following method:
where X is the year-over-year change and x is the monthly change in the trimmed mean. To obtain data at the quarterly frequency, I simply take the year-over-year rates for the end of quarter months (March, June, September, and December). A similar transformation is done to the headline inflation rates.
The above procedure is not exactly correct. The correct procedure, suggested by Bryan and Cecchetti, is to use the disaggregated data, produce the year-over-year price changes for each component, weight the components by relative importance and find the trimmed mean.
5
Empirically there is very little difference between the results obtained using the weighted median for the United States computed from the above methodology versus using the weighted median for the United States computed as dictated by Bryan and Cecchetti. Therefore, I use the data as transformed above rather than deriving the trimmed mean from the component level data for each country since these data are more readily available.
5 See Smith (2003) for details.
For the conditional regressions I use real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and industrial production at a quarterly frequency. 6 To get the output gap or industrial production gap I take the log of quarterly real GDP and industrial production and apply the Hodrick-Prescott (HP)
filter (with smoothing parameter 16,000). I use the HP filtered series as potential output. To find the output gap I subtract potential output from the actual quarterly series.
I divide my data into six time periods and I rank them in Table 2 There is also a discussion about whether non-inflation targeting countries have become less accommodative in the 1990s. By examining these two periods separately for the noninflation targeting countries this question can be studied. Mankiw contends that the Federal
Reserve of the United States has been conducting "covert inflation targeting" in the 1990s. He goes on to state that if the Federal Reserve had enacted an inflation target of 3 percent in the available on a quarterly basis so I exclude it from that part of the analysis. 7 The end dates vary from 1998 to 1999 based on the individual data availability for each country. The transparency and credibility of inflation targeting provides a clear policy objective to the public.
In this paper I use a non-stationary specification for inflation. This follows the work of Smith and Stock and Watson (1999) . The non-stationary specification lends itself in this framework because future inflation is estimated as a weighted average of lagged inflation and the trimmed mean. From this specification the relative contribution of each variable is easily understood and can be compared across regimes. Assuming that inflation and core inflation are cointegrated is reasonable in order to ensure that inflation and core inflation do not wander too far from one another. The theoretical model also emphasizes the cointegrated nature of inflation and demand-driven inflation or core inflation.
B. Unconditional results
The unconditional results show the level of accommodativeness different time periods or regimes have. If lagged inflation is core inflation then the regime is accommodative and supply shocks have permanent effects. But if the trimmed mean is core inflation then the regime is nonaccommodative and supply shocks are transitory. If core inflation is a combination of the two variables then the regime is partially accommodative.
Since I am using year-over-year quarterly data I need to correct for serial correlation of the error terms that arises due to the overlapping nature of the data. Also, I want to examine the countries as groups and allow for cross-country correlation within groups (i.e. within the noninflation targeting group and within the inflation targeting group). Allowing for the crosscountry correlation suggests that when one country is hit with an inflation shock it is likely that the other countries face a similar shock.
I use a two-step process since there is both serial correlation in the errors within a country and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across countries. First, I correct for the serial correlation in each country's errors by allowing the data to pick the best fitting Autoregressive (AR) model. The AR model is a reasonable approximation of the error structure. After eliminating the serial correlation I allow for contemporaneous correlation across countries and I estimate the system using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). I do not examine the details of each country's regression, but I consider the averages. I want to observe the regimes in general and note any differences or similarities. Sheridan follows this approach in her examination of changes in inflation and inflation expectations persistence. I estimate the following equation for each group of countries.
where * π is the transformed inflation rate and * x is the transformed trimmed mean. Appendix A explains the procedure in detail.
The unconditional results are in Table 3 . First, I compare the pre-1979 period and the post-1984 period. During the early period, lagged inflation is a better forecaster of future inflation than the trimmed mean. The coefficient on the trimmed mean is .09 and is insignificant for the pre-1979 period suggesting that the weight on lagged inflation is equal to one. In the historically known accommodative period of the 1970s, lagged inflation forecasts headline inflation well. During a period of accommodation any shock will be allowed to feed through to inflation permanently since the central bank does not take any action to counteract the shock.
During the post-1984 period, the results show that the trimmed mean forecasts future inflation better than lagged inflation. The coefficient on the trimmed mean is highly significant and close to one for both sets of countries with coefficient estimates of .84 and .74 for the noninflation targeting countries and the inflation targeting countries, respectively. This suggests that this period was much less accommodative than the earlier period.
The second set of comparisons in Table 3 
C. Conditional results
Conditioning on the output gap and then determining whether lagged inflation or the trimmed mean is core inflation provides information about whether inflation expectations are consistent with the levels of accommodativeness found in the unconditional results. A similar estimation procedure is followed to correct for serial correlation. The following equation is estimated by SUR:
9 In the full-sample results the lagged inflation term is significant but in the sub-sample results the lagged inflation 
where all variables are as described in the unconditional case and is the transformed output gap. 10 Recall if agents believe that there is an accommodative regime then lagged inflation is a better forecaster and if agents believe there is a non-accommodative regime than the trimmed mean is a better forecaster when conditioning on output. Policy makers do not determine if inflation rises with a supply shock but they do determine whether inflation stays high after a shock. term is not significant. The difference may be due to the fact that in the full sample the standard error is smaller because there are more data. 10 Ireland is excluded from this analysis since quarterly real GDP is not available before 1997.
Also interestingly the coefficient on real GDP falls substantially from 1.66 to .21 and the coefficient on industrial production decreases from .63 to .06 for the non-inflation targeting countries. The slope of the Phillips curve is flatter and therefore the central bank faces an increased tradeoff between inflation and output. Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) discuss how the lower average inflation over this period should make the Phillips curve flatter.
The pre-and post-1992:Q1 periods support similar results. In both periods the trimmed mean alone is core inflation for the non-inflation targeting countries. Inflation expectations do not change for the non-inflation targeting countries. Specifically, the coefficient on the trimmed mean increases from .79 to .91 when conditioning on output. Since the confidence intervals of these estimates overlap substantially it implies that the coefficients are basically equivalent.
When conditioning on industrial production the trimmed mean coefficient decreases from .88 to .85. None of these coefficients are statistically different from one. Inflation expectations have not changed between the 1980s and 1990s for non-inflation targeting countries.
Even for the inflation targeting countries there is no change in inflation expectations.
The coefficient on the trimmed mean decreases from 1.17 to .99 conditioning on real GDP and increases from .98 to 1.11 conditioning on industrial production. When conditioning on either measure of aggregate activity, the coefficient on the trimmed mean is not significantly different from one. From these results it appears that inflation targeting did not anchor inflation expectations any more than the disinflation of the early 1980s. Also, for the inflation targeting countries the coefficient on the output gap has fallen significantly during the inflation targeting period demonstrating that the tradeoff between inflation and output changes due to inflation targeting. The Phillips curve is flatter in these inflation targeting regimes suggesting an 11 The standard errors are in parentheses. and 1990s despite the idea that these countries were covert inflation targeters. Third, for inflation targeting countries the level of accommodativeness did decrease with the introduction of inflation targeting but agents' beliefs did not change, as they already believed that monetary policy was non-accommodative. Overall from these results it appears that there is a gain from moving from an accommodative to less accommodative regime for both inflation and inflation expectations but the gain from moving from a less accommodative to non-accommodative regime such as strict inflation targeting only arises for inflation. Under inflation targeting inflation is more anchored but inflation expectations are not.
Appendix A: Derivation of Empirical Model
Here is the formal derivation of my empirical model. I use this specification so that I can allow both serial correlation and cross country correlation in the regressions. In order to find the nature of serial correlation I run Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for the basic regression. (A4)
After obtaining the transformed data, I run SUR. SUR is a two-step process. In the first step the weighted data from serial correlation correction is used to estimate an equation for each country using OLS. From this set of regressions the variance-covariance of the residuals across countries is obtained. In the second step the coefficient estimates are obtained using this estimated variance-covariance matrix. 12 I estimate a system (with equation A3 for each country)
for each time period.
12 See Kmenta (1971) page 517-529 for more details.
Appendix B: Alternative Specification
There is an alternative framework that may be more appealing, especially under the strict inflation targeting period. This framework arises from the loss function of a central banker who cares about minimizing the deviations of inflation from its target and output from potential.
Under this framework the optimal policy depends on the preferences of the central bank.
From the loss function, an empirical specification can be derived. The empirical specification is
where future inflation is a weighted average of the target inflation rate, lagged inflation and the trimmed mean inflation rate. 13 Now future inflation depends on not just the trimmed mean and lagged inflation but also the target inflation rate chosen by the central bank.
14 The question that arises is what is non-accommodation under this specification. There are now two variables that
give the level of accommodation. For a monetary policy regime that does not accommodate inflation in general, meaning that neither demand nor supply shocks are accommodated, ρ will have a low or zero value. If a regime does accommodate inflation, does the regime only accommodate demand shocks or does it also accommodate supply shocks? For a regime that does not accommodate supply shocks, β will have a high value, close to one. Using this regression that permits the central bank to have a target inflation rate, allows for a distinction between accommodating inflation in general and accommodating only supply shocks.
13 More formally, the variables used in this regression are transformed similarly to the original specification as discussed in Appendix A. 14 Also, the choice of a target inflation rate is difficult except under the strict inflation targeting regime. For target inflation rates, I used the average inflation rate from the 1960s for the 1970s regressions, the average inflation rate from the concurrent period for the post-1984 regressions and the actual inflation targets in the inflation targeting period. A future robustness check would be to check if the results vary with the choice of targets.
The results obtained from regression B1 are very similar to those in our original regression and are found in Tables 6 -8 . One important point to note is that if ρ is approaching zero, especially if ρ is not significantly different from zero, then β is irrelevant to the discussion and will be estimated poorly.
The unconditional results are similar to the earlier results. Both inflation and supply shocks are accommodated during the 1970s but as central banks move toward strict inflation targeting, inflation is less accommodated and therefore supply shocks are less accommodated.
The non-inflation targeting regimes seem to be less accommodative of supply shocks earlier, perhaps in the 1980s than the inflation targeting countries.
The conditional results provide information about the inflation expectations of individuals during each of the monetary policy regimes. During the 1970s people believed inflation (demand shocks) and most supply shocks would be accommodated. In the post-1984 period, in non-inflation targeting countries people believed that inflation would not be accommodated on average. There is a different result for the inflation targeting countries where people believed demand shocks would be partially accommodated by the central bank and the evidence is mixed on whether individuals thought that supply shocks would be accommodated.
Considering inflation expectations in the pre-and post-inflation targeting eras, the results are slightly more difficult to interpret. There is a consistent result for the non-inflation targeting countries that the public believes that they do not accommodate inflation at all. It appears that people think that the average inflation that has been produced in the past is basically the inflation that the central bank will produce in the future. In inflation targeting countries, before inflation targeting was instituted people either thought the central bank was non-accommodative of all inflation or at least the central bank did not accommodate supply shocks. The good news is that the public does believe that once inflation targeting started that the central bank would generally produce inflation equal to its target and that it would no longer accommodate supply shocks.
This alternative regression analysis confirms most of the findings from the main part of the paper. In addition, these results support the idea that inflation targeting may not have changed the behavior of the economy greatly especially in the role of modifying inflation expectations. 1990:Q1 Consumer price index * New Zealand only produces a manufacturing production index. ** GDP is based on the old base year since it allows a longer sample period. It has no effect on the data availability since the trimmed mean determines the sample length. There is no a priori reason to believe that there is any difference between the pre-inflation targeting regime and the pre-1992 regime for the non-inflation targeting countries. Hence they are ranked equivalently. 
